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The war has taught the government, and the government has taught the people, 
that federal taxation has much to do with inflation and deflation, with the prices 
which have to be paid for the things which are bought and sold. If federal taxes 
are insufficient or of the wrong kind, the purchasing power in the hands of the 
public is likely to be greater than the output of goods and services with which 
this purchasing demand can be satisfied. If the demand becomes too great, the 
result will be a rise in prices, and there will be no proportionate increase in the 
quantity of things for sale. This will mean that the dollar is worth less than it 
was before – that is inflation. On the other hand, if federal taxes are too heavy 
or are of the wrong kind, effective purchasing power in the hands of the public 
will be insufficient to take from the producers of goods and services all the 
things these producers would like to make. This will mean widespread 
unemployment […].The dollars the government spends become purchasing 
power in the hands of the people who have received them. The dollars the 
government takes by taxes cannot be spent by the people, and therefore, these 
dollars can no longer be used to acquire the things which are available for sale. 
Taxation is, therefore, an instrument of the first importance in the 
administration of any fiscal and monetary policy. 
                                                                                   
                                                                                                           Beardsley Ruml
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1  Page 36 in Ruml, Beardsley. 1946. Taxes for Revenue is Obsolete. American Affairs, January 
1946. Vol VIII, No.1 
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1  Introduction 
 
In this paper I question Norges Banks ability to fine-tune inflation, as measured 
by the Norwegian Consumer Price Index, KPI, by monetary policy. I will base 
my critique of Inflation targeting (IT) on the school of Post-Keynesian 
economics. Post-Keynesians are not necessarily against IT per se, but they 
criticize how IT has caused fiscal policy to decline in importance, both as a tool 
to stabilize the economy and to control inflation. IT is considered very 
successful among its proponents. Countries adopting IT have experienced falling 
inflation, and for the most part have met their inflation targets. Not a single 
country adopting IT has later abandoned it. However, countries not 
implementing IT have also for the most part experienced falling inflation rates, 
causing some observers to attribute the fall in world-wide inflation to other 
phenomenon. At the same time recent experiences from the US and the EU 
shows that low and stable inflation do not necessarily guarantee healthy 
economic performance. I firmly believe that this is a result of degrading of fiscal 
policy as tool of achieving economic growth. This does not mean I reject the 
value of IT, or try to underestimate the theory achievements. However, I feel the 
debate between fiscal and monetary policy has been either or, with proponents 
of monetary policy winning. This is a serious problem if monetary policy is not 
powerful enough to counter a severe crisis.  
The paper is two-fold; first I provide a survey of important ingredients of 
inflation targeting, and then following up with some empirical evidence, trying 
to penetrate the effectiveness of IT. I will start out with a description of the 
transmission mechanism for monetary policy. Present the measures of inflation 
used in IT, followed by a presentation of the components in KPI. I then discuss 
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changes in monetary regimes in Norway since 1979 and a short description of 
fiscal policy in Norway. 
I use two methods to explore the extent Norges Bank can control inflation as 
measured by the Norwegian Consumer Price Index, KPI. First I follow 
Papadimitreou and Wray (1996) by inspecting the different subcomponents of 
KPI to see how likely it is that monetary policy can influence their prices 
compared to other factors. Here I will focus on direct effects, as secondary 
effects presumably can spill over into all of the components. I will then look at 
the weighted contribution to headline inflation from the components singled out 
to be most problematic.  
I will also follow a more quantitative approach by looking at inflation 
persistence of the individual components of the CPI, and to check if they are 
stationary. I will look at four different time periods from 1979 until today. The 
periods are divided into these periods because they represent different monetary 
regimes. If IT has been successful in bringing down inflation, we would expect 
inflation persistence to be quite low, we would also expect declining inflation 
persistence compared to past monetary regimes. 
One conclusion is that Norges Bank cannot directly influence large parts of the 
CPI, and that those components constitute a large portion of the weighed 
inflation of the CPI. That brings up the question whether the components should 
be removed from the measures of inflation used by Norges Bank. At the same 
time I find that inflation persistence has almost disappeared after the inception 
of IT. This suggests that IT have been successful at anchoring inflation around 
its target.   
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2  Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy 
 
This is meant to be a short survey of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. The control variable of the central bank is the short term interest rate. 
Previously there have been attempts by central banks to control different 
measures of the money supply; however, this is now mostly abandoned. As 
customary I will divide the Transmission mechanism of monetary policy into 
different channels. These channels are: 
Interest rate channel 
Exchange rate channel 
Asset price channel 
Credit channel 
The broad Credit channel 
Expectation channel 
Interest payments on government bonds 
The first six channels are the ones usually listed by scholars and central bankers 
alike. I have also included a seventh channel which opens for the possibility that 
changes in interest payments done by the government influence inflation. This 
depends on a set of assumptions I will return to later. I will go over these 
channels one by one, along with a short explanation. The effects from the 
channels on headline inflation will depend on a variety of factors, which is 
country specific and will change over time. Figure 1 illustrates the interactions 
of the different channels. The complex nature of the transmission mechanism 
makes it hard to separate the effects from different channels. To further 
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complicate the picture, shocks outside of the control of the central bank 
influence inflation. 
Figure 1. Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy 
 
Source: ECB 
 
2.1 Interest Rate Channel 
 
As a monopoly supplier of bank reserves Norges Bank can freely set the short-
term interest rate. Norges Bank controls the rate by offering interest rate on bank 
reserves, which creates a floor for interest rates in the economy. Depending on 
expectations, a change in short-term interest rate will cause changes in the 
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money-markets rates and long-term interest rates. Presumably interest rate 
changes will influence business investments and household demand for durables, 
including housing, in the same direction. Increasingly household’s also finance 
consumption of non-durables with credit. In Norway most households choose a 
floating interest rate on their mortgages. Hence, an increase of short term 
interest rates will cut disposable income for most households that are in debt. 
However, interest effects on consumption depend on the differences of the 
marginal propensity to consume, MPC, between creditors and debtors. If MPC is, 
as often assumed, higher among debtors than creditors the isolated effect of an 
increase in interest rates will be GDP contraction. My guess is that this effect of 
the interest channel will mainly be determined by the interest elasticity of 
investments. In Norway its absolute value is rather high for household for 
durables and housing, whole less so for business. 
A natural consequence of exogenous interest rates in an economy with a floating 
currency is that Norges Bank will not set interest rates so high as to create a 
credit crunch. At least not on purpose since this will conflict its mandate of 
promoting a robust and efficient financial system. The large private debt 
relatively to GDP in Norway puts a ceiling on the level of the interest rates that 
Norges Bank in practice can choose from. Theoretically it is conceivable that a 
situation can occur where interest rates hits that ceiling while still not high 
enough to curb inflation. Hence, a conflict can arise between Norges Bank’s 
different mandates. 
The theory of intertemporal substitution of consumption suggests that 
consumers transfer consumption to the future confronted with interest rate hikes. 
Assuming consumers have concave utility functions. Hence, an increase in the 
interest rate increases household savings. 
Interest rates influence cost of goods because of inventories and goods under 
production. The latter effect will be most influential for durable goods that take 
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a long time to produce. The cost pass-through will determine how much of the 
increases in cost will be passed on to consumers. 
 
2.2 Exchange Rate Channel 
 
All other factors equal economic theory suggests that unexpected change in the 
interest rate will change the exchange rate in the same direction. If the interest 
rate is reduced imported goods and services become more expensive, while the 
ones exported will become cheaper, stimulating domestic demand. Hence, a 
depreciation of the Norwegian krone will increase inflation. How much the 
change in the exchange rate affects consumer prices depends on exchange rate 
pass-through. The degree of the exchange rate pass-through is defined as 
elasticity of import prices with respect to the exchange rate, Rødseth (2000). 
Norges Banks ability to influence this channel depends on the elasticity of the 
exchange rate with respect to the interest rate. Because of the importance of this 
channel I will provide a short discussion, as well as some empirical results. 
For most goods and services pass-through is not complete, which means it is less 
than one. 
Mishkin (2008) provides reasons: 
Price to market, which assumes monopolistically competitive markets, where 
optimizing firms vary their mark-up across different national markets depending 
on the elasticity of demand they face in each market. If the currency of the 
exporter’s country appreciates he will reduce mark-up to maintain market shares. 
Local currency pricing, which means that an exporter sets the price of the good 
in the currency of the country to which it export, this leads to lower pass-
through in combination with nominal price rigidities. This impact is largest for 
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big markets like the US; in a small country there are fewer firms that produce 
close substitutes to imports. Rødseth (2000). This is opposite to producer 
currency pricing where it is assumed that prices are set in the currency of the 
exporter, this implies full pass-through. 
Distribution cost make up a considerable part of the retail cost of imported 
goods. 
Cross-border production lowers pass-through because the final good embodies 
cost in various currencies that may not all move together. 
Mishkin (2008) surveys empirical evidence of pass-through, and cites Gagnon 
and Ihrig (2004), who estimated pass-through in a set of 20 industrial countries 
over the 1971-2000 period to be roughly 0.2, with most of the adjustment 
occurring quickly. By splitting their sample using country specific break-points 
they found that pass-through has fallen over time. In the last period of their 
sample they found pass-through to be only 0.05. Mishkin (2008) also cites 
Marazzi and Sheets (2007), who claims that pass-through to import prices fell 
from around 0.5 in the 1970s and 1980s to 0.2 in the 1990s. The decline in 
responsiveness was especially apparent in consumer goods, capital goods 
excluding computers and semi-conductors and automotive products suggesting 
pass-through is different for different goods and services. 
For Norway Naug and Nymoen (1996) find that the exchange rate pass-through 
to be 0.6 for manufactured imports to Norway. 
Boug et al (2005) have modeled exchange rate pass-through in Norway, with the 
added benefit of looking at pass-through effects on components of the CPI. In 
their model they assume producer currency pricing for import prices, or 
equivalently wholesale prices, while assuming local currency pricing for retail 
prices. They include profitability effects in export and import sector as well as 
potential wage-price spiral caused by the currency depreciation. In their model 
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pass-through will be complete in the long run by assumption; however the pass-
through is muted in the short run because of mark-ups in the distribution sector 
move in the same direction as the exchange rate. The estimated effects can be 
seen inTable1. 
Table 1. Exchange rate pass-through in Norway. 
Consumer price effects of 10 percent exchange rate depreciation (on a 
permanent basis). Deviations from baseline scenario. 
 1. year 2. year 3. year 4. year 5.year 
Food 1.7 3.5 3.9 4.1 6.4 
Beverages 1.8 3.5 4.1 4.5 6.6 
Tobacco 1.6 3.5 3.9 4 6.2 
Petrol 2.5 4.6 5.3 5.7 7.6 
Electricity, heating oil etc. 1.8 3.7 4.1 4.6 6.3 
Clothing and footwear 3.3 5.3 5.3 5.4 7.1 
Cars 3.8 4.9 5.3 5.6 7.2 
Furniture, electrical 
appliances 
2.7 4.7 5 5.2 7.1 
Housing 0 1 1.9 1.8 3.9 
Public Transport 0.1 0.7 1.3 1.7 3.7 
Health Care 0.8 1.9 2.7 3.2 5.6 
Other goods 2.6 4.8 5 5.1 7.1 
Other services 0.8 1.9 2.6 3.1 5.5 
Trade margins 0.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 6 
CPI-Inflation 1.6 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.2 
Consumer Price Index 1.6 3 3.6 3.8 5.8 
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Pass-through is larger on goods than services; this reflects the large import 
shares of goods. Since trade margins rise less than CPI-inflation the pass-
through to consumer prices is delayed in the first year. We note that the pass-
through is not complete even after five years. Trade margins increase a lot in the 
second year contributing to persistence in the CPI inflation. The authors 
conclude that even if the pass-through is rather slow, changes in the exchange 
rate have substantial effect on headline inflation, both in the short and long run. 
Bjørnland and Hungnes (2006) forecast the exchange rate of the krone based on 
a model with purchasing power parity and the differential between the domestic 
and foreign interest rate. They show that their model does perform better than a 
random walk, however only if the interest rate differential is included. 
Naug (2004) regress the change in the exchange rate of the krone on the lag of 
the level and on its own lag, the oil price, a measure of exchange rate volatility, 
lags of the interest rate differential. He also look at movements in international 
stock prices, here he expects the krone to appreciate if investors expect low risk 
adjusted return in the stock market, assuming they will net buy assets in 
currencies with high yield. He also includes a stochastic trend to capture effects 
of unobserved variables that might affect the risk premium and exchange rate 
expectations. 
He estimates that roughly 40 percent of the appreciation was due to interest rate 
increases. On average he expects a permanent increase in the interest rate 
differential will produce currency shifts all others variables constant, as shown 
in Table 2: 
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Table 2. Effects on the exchange rate of a 1 percentage point increase in the 
interest rate. 
Months after change 0 5 9 12 48 
Increase in interest rate differential 
by 1 percentage point 
-2 -3.5 -6 -6.1 -6.1 
Sorce: Naug (2004) 
Naug also note that how sensitive the krone is to the interest rate differential 
depends on other variables, making it difficult for Norges Bank to calculate the 
effect at a given point in time. 
Norges Bank only looks at the exchange rate to the extent it influences headline 
inflation. Since the krone is floating they do not need it to hit a specific target, 
but should at least be able to control the direction of the Norwegian krone with 
monetary policy. The research of Naug and Bjørnland and Hungnes, indicates 
they can achieve that, at least in times of a relatively stable risk premium. The 
effect from exchange rates to consumer prices is limited by exchange rate pass-
through, which is less than one. Considering exchange rate volatility and 
Norway’s open economy, this sluggishness makes it easier for Norges Bank to 
hit its inflation rate target. It also seems that the exchange rate react faster to 
changes in the interest rate differential, than exchange rate pass-through to work 
its course. This gives Norges Bank time to react to changes in the exchange rate 
before the full effect materializes in inflation. 
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2.3  Asset Price Channel 
 
Unexpected changes in short-term interests will all, other equal, move asset 
prices, most notably equities, bonds and housing, in the opposite direction. 
People will consume parts of the income from capital gains, which is called the 
wealth effect. 
Case et al (2005) estimates the wealth effect in a comprehensive study 
consisting of US states during the period 1982-1999 and 14 developed countries, 
including Norway, during the period 1975-1999. Their estimates use different 
models so I only report the results in their conclusion. A 10 percent increase in 
housing prices increase consumption by 1.1 percent for the selected countries, 
while 0.4 percent for the US. The wealth effect on stock-market gains was not 
statistically significant. In a more recent paper, Case et al (2011) still do not find 
any significant proof of the wealth-effect in the stock market. The housing 
wealth elasticity of consumption is asymmetric depending on whether house 
prices increase or decrease. They estimate it to be 0.032 in a rising market and 
0.1 in a falling market. 
Asset price increases would likely also lead to more investment according to 
Tobin's q-theory, where q is the market price divided by replacement cost of 
capital. If q is greater than one there is an insentient to increase investments. 
Some central banks, like the Federal Reserve and Bank of Japan, have in recent 
years started to target asset in hopes the wealth effect will promote economic 
growth. Time will tell if targeting asset prices becomes a significant tool of 
monetary policy. The results of Case et al (2005) suggest the wealth effect is too 
small to make a significant impact on economic growth. 
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2.4  The Narrow Credit Channel  
 
The discussion on the narrow channel is based on Arestis and Sawyer (2002), 
who cites Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Hall (2001). This channel assumes 
that the central bank controls the money supply via changes in bank reserves. 
Constraining bank reserves will, under this framework, reduce the money supply; 
hence reduce aggregate demand which will curtail inflation. Norges bank does 
not have any mandatory reserve requirements for banks, and provide bank 
reserves on demand from the banking system, Flatner and Tornes (2002). Hence 
Norges Bank does not try to control the money supply via bank reserves. Banks 
in Norway are never reserve constrained; however, they are subject to capital 
requirements. It is plausible that increased capital requirements will result in less 
bank lending, and reduce money supply. 
 
2.5  The broad Credit channel 
 
This discussion is also based on Arestis and Sawyer (2002), who cites Bernanke 
and Gertler (1999). This channel is based on asymmetric information between 
borrowers and lenders. Banks charge lenders a premium to cover monitoring 
costs. Increased (decreased) interest rate impairs (improves) firms and 
households balance sheet. Collateral falls in value when asset prices declines, 
while debt remains constant. When a firm or household balance sheets worsen, 
banks will increase the interest rate premium to cover increased monitoring 
costs, or possibly tightening lending standards to the extent that some firms and 
consumers to no longer have access to bank credit. This will affect consumption 
and in turn aggregate demand. 
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2.6  Interest payments on government bonds 
 
Tauheed and Wray (2006) and Bell-Kelton and Ballinger (2005), have 
considered inflation caused by interest payments on government liabilities. This 
assumes that there is no crowding out of the private sector, and that the 
government pays interest with newly created currency. Tauheed and Wray (2006) 
try to find combinations of debt levels and interest rates necessary so that 
aggregate demand increase when interest rates increases, and hence inflation. In 
their model investments is the only factor decreasing aggregate demand when 
interest rates increases. All public debt is assumed to be owned by domestic 
households. The marginal propensity to consume out of interest payments is set 
at 0.9, which according to Case et al (2005), is unreasonable high. In their model 
inflation can be created by raising the interest rate with the debt ratio of 50 
percent and interest rates at 10 percent. Ballinger and Bell-Kelton (2005) claims 
that in countries where public debt levels are approaching 100 percent, 
increasing the interest rate will stimulate GDP. This implies that the countries 
surveyed did not cut other expenditure to offset increased interest rates 
payments.   
A concrete example of this phenomenon is Italy in the mid-nineties. Although 
Italy had a primary surplus the overall deficit was large due to public debt of 
100 percent at GDP and average interest rates on its liabilities of 10 percent. 
Inflation seemed to have subsided when the central banks lowered interest rates. 
Levin and Piger (2003), when looking at structural breaks found that Italy’s 
inflation fell in the mid-nineties, against late eighties or early nineties for most 
other industrial countries. 
Public debt in Norway is around 45 percent of GDP and interest rates are 
currently under 3 percent for 10 year bonds. Interest rates payments in Norway 
will have a small effect on inflation. In other countries like the US, and 
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especially Japan, are so high that increased interest rates may create inflation. If 
other countries get trapped with a low interest rate, this will limit the scope of 
Norges Bank to set interest rates via the differential between domestic and 
foreign interest rates.   
 
2.7  Expectation Channel 
 
It is no doubt that inflation expectations are important for future inflation. This 
seems to be agreed upon among most economic schools. If a central bank is 
credible it will anchor inflation expectations around the target. If firms believe 
the central bank can control future aggregate demand as to hit the inflation target 
that will influence the future expected costs and prices the firms itself faces.  
The Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England (1999) points out that 
investment decisions are made on the assumption of future real interest rates. If 
inflation expectations is equal to the target real interest rates will move in 
tandem with nominal rates, giving the central bank control of the real interest 
rate. Stable inflation expectations will at the same time reduce the probability of 
a wage-price spiral. 
 
2.8  Empirical Evidence of the Transmission Mechanism 
 
Arestis and Sawyer (2002) survey empirical evidence of the transmission 
mechanism based on Angeoni et al (2002) and Locarno et al (2001). Their 
results are presented in the tables below. All coefficients are semi-elasticity 
multipliers. 
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Table 3 is calculated by Arestis and Sawyer (2002) based on the research of 
Angeloni et al (2002). For completeness sake I include the estimated effects on 
other macroeconomic variables 
 
Table 3. Effects of a one percentage point increase in the interest rate 
maintained for two years.  
 EMM AWM 
 Year 1 Year 3 Year 1 Year 3 
Consumer Prices -0.09 -0.31 -0.15 -0.38 
GDP -0.22 -0.31 -0.34 -0.71 
Consumption -0.12 -0.19 -0.27 -0.54 
Investment -0.34 -1.22 -0.81 -2.96 
Source: Angeloni et al (2002), table 2. 
 Notes:  
EMM (European Macroeconometric Model) calculations. 
AWN (ECB Area-Wide Model) calculations. 
Year 1 and year 3 refers to average deviations from baseline. 
 
Locarno et al. (2001) provides estimates from many countries in the European 
Union in their Annex. Table 4 and 5 are summaries of those taken from Arestis 
and Sawyer (2002).  
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Table 4 Effects of a one percentage point increase in the interest rate 
maintained for two years. Aggregate (Based on National Models) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP Deflator -0.04 -0.20 -0.35 -0.43 -0.41 
Inflation* -0.04 -0.16 -0.15 -0.08 0.02 
GDP -0.22 -0.38 -0.31 -0.14 -0.02 
Private Consumption -0.12 -0.23 -0.19 -0.06 0.01 
Investment -0.34 -1.04 -1.22 -0.80 -0.39 
Unemployment 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.11 
Source: Locarno et al. (2001) 
Table 5. One percentage point increase in the interest rate maintained for 
two years. AWN Model. 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP Deflator -0.10 -0.31 -0.44 -0.57 -0.76 
Inflation* -0.10 -0.21 -0.13 -0.13 -0.19 
GDP -0.34 -0.71 -0.71 -0.63 -0.57 
Private Consumption -0.27 -0.58 -0.54 -0.43 -0.37 
Investment -0.81 -2.37 -2.96 -2.63 -2.42 
Unemployment 0.10 0.39 0.58 0.62 0.58 
Source: Locarno et al. (2001) 
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Locarno et al also hints at which of the transmission mechanism that is the most 
important and states, “The dominant channel of transmission in the first two 
years--both in terms of its impact on output and on prices--is the exchange rate 
channel. However, in terms of the impact on output, from the third year of the 
simulation onwards the user cost of capital channel becomes dominant”. 
The Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England (1999) estimates the effects 
on inflation after a 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate maintained for 
one year. Inflation does not seem to react before after a year, while maximum 
impact is a fall in inflation between 0.2 and 0.4 percentage points after 9 
quarters. 
Falch and Nymoen (2011) forecast inflation in Norway with a model that has a 
better track record than Norges Bank's own model. They estimate a 1percentage 
point increase in the interest rate to lower inflation by 0.115 percentage points, 
with a standard deviation of 0.024. One percentage point increase in the 
differential between foreign and domestic interest rates will lower inflation by 
0.073 percentage points, with a standard deviation of 0.018. 
Even notable inflation targeting critics like Arestis and Sawyer do not doubt the 
ability of the central bank to influence the inflation rate, or other 
macroeconomic variables, via monetary policy. Its effect on inflation seems too 
small to contain inflation if it increased substantially. In such a situation interest 
rates must be increased to a level that could create a credit crunch. Monetary 
policy should be able to handle moderate inflationary pressure. Increases in the 
inflation rate of a couple of percentage points could be fought by increasing the 
interest rate three to four percentage points, assuming the relationship in the 
discussion above is linear. Even if Norges Bank seems to be able to contain 
moderate inflation pressure, it is less likely they will be able to create inflation 
in a deflationary environment. With interest rates already low there is not much 
scope to create inflation before interest rates hits the zero bound. 
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3  Measures of Core Inflation 
 
Measures of core inflation are for the most part derivatives of the CPI, typically 
some components from the CPI is either excluded and/or re-weighted. Most 
often one excludes or re-weights volatile components. Especially if they are 
stationary, in which case experience will suggest the components will revert to 
the mean. If a country wants to target inflation it needs to decide on which 
measure, or measures, of inflation to target. In Norway, the central bank targets 
headline inflation. However, they will still make use of measures of core 
inflation to guide policy, mainly because core inflation is typically less noisy 
and is a predictor of future headline inflation. In this section I will briefly 
discuss different criteria of core inflation from the literature. I will also discuss 
Norges Banks measures of core inflation.  The main reason for this exercise is to 
check which criteria are used to eliminate or re-weight components. I note that, 
with a few exceptions, the belief in the omnipotent central bank prevails, since 
there is no much concern of the ability to the central bank in controlling inflation 
in each of the components.    
Monetary policy in Norway targets headline inflation measured by the 
Norwegian CPI, KPI. Originally KPI is a Cost-of-Living index measuring 
monetary compensation required to have the same utility of consumption when 
prices change over time. Technicalities concerning construction of KPI will not 
be explored in this paper.   
Core inflation tries to capture the underlying trend in inflation. Blinder (1997) 
defines core inflation as the durable or persistent part of inflation. In this part we 
will look at different measures of computing core inflation and commonly cited 
criteria for core inflation. It is beyond the scope of this paper to compare the 
different measures. Particularly since which measure is the best is also probably 
country specific, as suggested by Silver (2006). Bulman et al (2004) have 
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pointed out performance can be advanced if central bankers looks at several 
measures of core inflation. 
The methods of manipulating CPI into a measure for core inflation are outlined 
by Silver (2006). He groups the methods by those formulated to predict inflation 
and those suited for policy assessment. The latter group consists of excluding 
certain components from the core inflation, either permanently or by discretion, 
so that the index is designed to strip away noise to identify the signal. The 
reasons for excluding certain components can be to avoid one-off shocks, to 
focus on domestically generated inflation to remove components in the CPI that 
are imputed. It is customary to remove the impact on inflation caused by 
changes in taxes or duties. Other measures for policy assessment are to use trend 
estimates, median or trimmed means. A trimmed mean will remove a 
predetermined percentage of the CPI. That is the components with the highest 
price rises and largest decline is removed. The components are sorted by 
inflation rate, from largest to smallest. Components are then removed, in the top 
and bottom, until the weights of the removed components correspond to the 
predetermined percentage in the trimmed mean.  These percentages can be 
symmetric so the same percentage of the components with the largest and 
smallest inflation rate is removed, however they can also be asymmetric. The 
trimmed median is the trimmed mean with 50 percent removed in each tail. 
Silver (2006) notes that removing noise from the CPI leads to a more predictive 
measure, and a measure formulated to predict also removes noise. 
No consensus exists about the criteria for measuring core inflation, however the 
criteria of Roger (1998) and Wynne (2008) seems to have gained some traction. 
Roger’s criteria’s can be summarized as the following, measures of core 
inflation should be: 
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Robust and unbiased. The measure should be able to separate persistent 
(expectations and demand-related) and transient (supply-related) inflation. The 
measure of core inflation should also not be significantly biased relative to the 
target measure of inflation. 
Timely. The measure of core inflation computable in real time, or at the same 
time headline inflation is published, and not be subject to revisions. 
Credible. To avoid suspicion of manipulation by the central bank or the treasury 
an independent agent should calculate the measures of core inflation used to 
conduct monetary policy. The same measures of core inflation should be easy 
for the public to understand. 
Wynne (2008) supports those criteria and adds some of his own. He claims that 
a measure of core inflation should: 
Be able to forecast inflation 
Have a track record 
Have some theoretical basis in monetary theory 
Eckstein (1981) was one of the first to define core inflation as: “The trend rate in 
the price of aggregate supply”. He postulated that inflation,    could be broken 
down into three components, core inflation,  , demand inflation,      and shock 
inflation,   . Hence,               . Arestis et al (2006) claims this 
definition indicates that core inflation is largely indirectly determined by money 
wage growth and raw materials. 
 
Cutler (2001) follows the spirit of Blinder (1997) and creates a persistence-
weighted measure of core inflation. She re-weights the components according to 
their level of persistence, with the most persistent components given the largest 
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weights and lower weights to the least persistent. The main goal of this measure 
is its ability to forecast inflation, and less to identify current underlying inflation 
rate. This shows the benefit of using different measures of core inflation when 
conducting monetary policy, since a single measure will not tend to outperform 
the others on the criteria above. 
Blinder (1997) suggests excluding food and energy prices because he claims a 
central bank cannot control the prices of those components with monetary policy. 
Papadimitrou and Wray (1996) goes one step further and claims that the Fed has 
limited control over rental prices that determines owner-equivalent rent in the 
CPI, sharing Blinder’s view that such components should be excluded. Silver 
(2006) believes, however, that it is not obvious that such components should be 
excluded on the ground that stable overall inflation is important for inflation 
expectations. Both Blinder and Papadimitrou and Wray suggest that high 
inflation in one of those components could force the economy into recession. In 
that case, curbing overall inflation may necessitate deflation in the components 
the Fed controls, and very tight monetary policy. As we will come back to later, 
this is also an issue in Norway, which also use imputed rental costs for home 
owners in the KPI. Further candidates for components which a central bank has 
limited control over is imported goods, and goods and services where the 
government sets the price. 
 
3.1  Norges Bank’s Measures of Core Inflation 
 
Norges Banks measure of inflation target is the headline KPI. However, they use 
four main measures of core inflation as indicators for monetary policy. These 
measures of core inflation are trimmed mean, weighted mean, KPIJAE and 
KPIXE, Jonassen and Norbø (2006). The main reason to look at these indicators 
is to help the central bank to avoid reacting to temporarily changes, due to 
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supply shocks, in headline inflation. All of the measures of core inflation are 
calculated by SSB, Statistics Norway. The indicators of inflation is found at 
Norges Bank (2013). 
KPIJAE is the KPI adjusted for changes in taxes and exempt energy. The energy 
components can be found under fuel and electricity in the Housing component 
and fuel and lubricants in the Transport component. KPIXE is a newer index of 
core inflation, being calculated since 2008. KPIXE is KPI adjusted for taxes and 
without temporary changes in energy prices, Hov (2009). The trend of energy 
prices is estimated in the KPIXE using historical and future prices. Forward 
contracts for electricity and oil are used to estimate future prices. The trend is 
smoothed by a Hodrick-Prescott filter. KPIXE is not subject to revision. Over 
time KPIXE will converge with KPI, as long as there are no substantial changes 
in taxes. As mentioned the target for monetary policy is KPI, however the other 
indexes are used to avoid reacting to temporary changes in the KPI. That is, 
Norges Bank will not react to direct effects on consumer prices due to changes 
in the interest rates, taxes or temporarily changes in the price level of some 
component. However, they will not accommodate second round effects. As of 
June 2013 the computation of KPIXE is altered because it was felt that the trend 
in energy prices was too volatile. In short they now calculate twelve month 
increase in the KPIXE as a weighted average of the twelve month increase in the 
KPIJAE and the twelve month increase in the trend in energy prices. The way to 
calculate the trend in energy prices have been slightly altered over time. 
The weighted median and trimmed mean is constructed as mentioned earlier in 
the last paragraph. The trimmed mean Norges Bank uses cuts the largest price 
rises and largest price declines until the weight of the components discarded 
comprises 10 percent in each tail.  
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4  Fiscal Policy and Inflation in Norway 
 
Government deficits will have different impact on inflation depending on how 
they are financed. To establish that point I will go through fiscal and monetary 
operations Norway.  Indirectly the government deficit in Norwegian kroner is 
financed by selling foreign currency, earned by taxes from the petroleum sector, 
as opposed to finance the deficit by issuing net financial assets in Norwegian 
kroner. Until recently Norges Bank’s model for monetary policy, NEMO, 
treated fiscal policy as an exogenous variable, where government expenditures 
are financed by a head tax, Brubakk and Sveen (2008). This simplification is not 
necessarily problematic since a central bank does not need to know the sources 
of inflation to conduct monetary policy. The information they need needed is 
captured in the measures of inflation and the output gap among others. However, 
if Norwegian interest rates hit the zero bound, then fiscal policy might be needed 
to make inflation hit the target. 
Norway has a fiscal policy rule, «Handlingsregelen», HR, outlined by the 
Ministry of Finance (2001). The rule states target for government deficit 
spending in Norwegian kroner.  Explicitly the rule states that each year, 
government deficit spending, adjusted for income on oil and gas, and should 
equal the expected real return on Norway's sovereign wealth fund, Statens 
Pensjonsfond-Utland, SPU, measured at the start of the budget year. The 
expected real return is 4 percent. With the current size of GDP and SPU Norway 
can deficit spend roughly 6.5 percent of GDP each fiscal year .The deficit is 
allowed to deviate from HR to let the automatic stabilizers in the economy work 
during downturns and discretionary counter-cyclical fiscal policy. 
  
Taxes from the petroleum sector in Norway are divided between its sovereign 
wealth fund, SPU, and the treasury where it is used to finance the deficit in 
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Norwegian kroner, Aamodt (2012). The Norwegian government deficit spends 
in Norwegian kroner, while at the same time save assets denominated in foreign 
exchange. The Norwegian government has income from the oil and gas sector. 
This income is mainly from three sources, sale of the government own 
production of oil, SDØE, their share of the dividend by the partly private owned 
Statoil and taxes levied on the oil companies operating in the Norwegian sector. 
Income from the former source is already denominated in foreign exchange, but 
the two latter sources are paid in Norwegian kroner. The oil companies, of 
course, have most of their income in foreign exchange and must obtain kroner to 
pay their taxes. Norges Bank, on behalf of the government will in turn buy 
foreign exchange in the amount of the surplus of the government budget. The 
foreign exchange is transferred to SPU, which invests in stocks, bonds and real 
estate abroad. The government’s total cash flow from the petroleum sector is 
subsequently divided between SPU and finance for the budget deficit, corrected 
for the former cash flow. Note that the end result on the participant’s balance 
sheets would be the same if all cash flow from the petroleum sector where paid 
in foreign exchange, then Norges Bank change some of it for Norwegian kroner 
to finance the budget deficit, while shipping the rest to SPU. In either case the 
central bank net buy Norwegian kroner. Presumably this will lead to, all else 
equal, to gradually strengthen the Norwegian kroner against other currencies. 
The mechanism for financing the deficit in Norwegian krone also acts as a 
mechanism for transferring government’s income from oil and gas to the private 
sector. The benefit being that the krone is stronger than it otherwise would have 
been, hence higher international purchasing power for Norwegian consumers. 
Instead of solely relying on financing the deficit in Norwegian kroner the 
treasury could finance parts or all of it by issuing financial liabilities in its own 
currency. That is, if it wants to create inflation. If deficits crowd out private 
investments by lending from the private sector one might argue that deficits are 
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not inflationary. This will not be the case in Norway.  Norges Bank controls the 
short-term interest rate by providing liquidity to the banking system to make 
sure it always has surplus reserves in the aggregate and by paying interest on 
these reserves, Fidjestøl (2007).  By paying interest on reserves Norges Bank 
creates a floor on the interest rate in the economy. Bank reserves are, among 
others added, by government spending and drained by taxes. Likewise there will 
be a reserve drain when the government borrows money from the private sector. 
Norges Bank provides reserves on demand from the banking system so this 
operation will be offset by a liquidity injection if needed. Analytically the result 
would be almost the same if the government borrowed directly from the central 
bank, the difference being that the private sector would have bank deposits 
instead of government bonds after deficit spending. Since the banking sector 
does not lose reserves after the government lends money, it does not affect their 
ability to make loans to the private sector. When the government spends money 
it has borrowed it creates net financial assets for the private sector.  
It is not clear how inflationary government deficit spending is. Catão and 
Terrones (2003) find strong positive association between deficits and inflation 
among high-inflation and developing country groups, but not among low-
inflation advanced economies. The relation is probably not linear; however, if 
the deficits become “large” enough one would believe it should be inflationary. 
It is also possible that a situation arises where the deficit must be much larger 
than the deficit prescribed in HR to sustain GDP. In this case one can have large 
deficits without it causing inflation because it is offset by increased savings in 
the private sector. Deficit spending in Norwegian kroner will have two effects, 
inflation due to extra demand and the effects on the exchange rate. In Norway’s 
case there would be a difference if it changed the composition of how to finance 
the deficit by selling foreign currency and issuing assets denominated in 
Norwegian krone, with the latter option being presumably more inflationary 
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than the former. The added demand could potentially crowd out investment if 
the central bank reacts with higher interest rate. If inflation is already below the 
target, this will likely not happen. 
It is possible that Norway enters a period of low economic activity and a strong 
krone at the same time. The low activity will likely cause the deficit in 
Norwegian krone to expand, with the risk of exchange rate appreciation. During 
a crisis it is possible that the krone will take a hit as it has done in the past, but 
after the dust have settled the krone usually appreciates after the risk premium 
goes down again. In such a scenario it is possible that monetary policy is not 
capable to hold inflation at the target being that deflationary forces are too 
strong. In such a situation one could finance parts of the deficit in Norwegian 
kroner. If the banking system is structurally in surplus versus the central bank, 
the treasury will borrow from the public sector; otherwise it will indirectly 
borrow from the central bank via the banking system. One proposal is to peg the 
amount financed by foreign exchange and let the deficit in Norwegian krone 
adjust to the business cycle. Then the treasury would have complete control over 
the deficit in foreign exchange. At the same time the deficit would be allowed to 
close, or go into surplus, since a deficit in foreign exchange could be offset by a 
surplus in Norwegian kroner.   
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5  Components of the CPI 
 
The components of the CPI and their corresponding weights as of September 
2013 are as follows: 
 
Component Weight measured by % 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            13.17 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              4.14 
Clothing and footwear                                                              5.37 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  22.22 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              5.84 
Healthcare 2.89 
Transport   14.86 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                2.67 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 12.72 
Education 0.3 
Hotel- and Restaurant services                                                  5.18 
Other Goods and Services                                                       10.64 
 
I will go through these components and their sub components in order to check 
monetary policy's likely impact on the components inflation rate. I will focus on 
the medium-term, which corresponds to the horizon Norges Bank has for the 
inflation target. The medium-term is about one to three years. Housing will be 
treated carefully, because of its high weighted contribution to inflation, and 
since the transmission mechanism do not seem to work as intended on housing. 
Norges Bank can influence all components via the parts of the transmission 
channel that affect aggregate demand. An example would be changes in 
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investments induced by monetary policy. I will focus on attributes on the 
components that indicate that monetary policy has moderate impact on their 
inflation rate, and divide them into categories, which are: 
Prices that is partly or fully politically determined 
Special taxes or dues on a component 
Imputed prices 
From the paragraph on the exchange rate channel I have already shown 
estimates of Norges Banks ability to control components which have a large 
share of imported goods or services. For exchange rate pass-through for the 
components I refer to Table 1.  
After I have identified the most problematic components I will look at their 
weighted contribution to headline inflation. I find that much of the contribution 
to inflation have come from components where Norges Bank have limited 
control. This raises the question whether they belong in the measure of the target 
or indicators for inflation targeting. 
All statistical material in this section is taken from Statistics Norway, as well as 
information of components and sub-components. I have also used material from 
Statistics Norway (2001). 
 
5.1  Food and non-alcohol beverages    
 
Prices of food in Norway are partly determined by domestic policies, Sand and 
Støholen (2008). Food production in Norway is protected from foreign 
competition by tariffs. The government and farmer associations negotiate for 
target prices for agricultural products to be in effect for each year. In turn prices 
will also be affected by negotiations between food processors and supermarket 
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chains. International prices for food will influence prices in Norway mainly 
through two channels. First, some products are not produced in Norway, hence 
will be imported at world market prices with low, or no tariffs. Also, if domestic 
price determination causes the price to exceed the negotiated target price, 
imports will be allowed to press the price back to its target. The contribution to 
inflation from imported food is relatively small. During 2012 the value of the 
food and non-alcoholic beverages was 143.2 billion kroner, while import was 
32.8 billion. Prices, and hence inflation, of food and non-alcoholic beverages is 
then partly determined by the government. The consequence being that food 
prices in Norway is some of the highest in the world. At the same time it causes 
volatility to be lower than in most countries. This is the reason for the 
component of food and non-alcoholic beverages being included, unlike most 
countries, in Norges Banks measures of core inflation. Since some of the food is 
imported a stronger krone will reduce inflation, all other factors equal. I 
conclude that domestic policies partly determine the prices paid to the farmers, 
which transcend into retail prices, although not necessarily one –to-one because 
the market for food in Norway is highly concentrated.   
 
5.2  Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products    
 
Prices of alcoholic beverages and tobacco are mainly determined by the 
government since both product types have a high tax rate. The total consumption 
of alcoholic beverages and tobacco during 2012 was 45.011 billion kroner; of 
which 19.456 billion was taxes. Obviously, taxes increase the price level and not 
inflation per se, and as noted taxes are excluded from KPIJAE and KPIXAE. 
However, these products are taxed to discourage consumption and are subject to 
frequent tax changes. These changes reflect the current political stance of how 
much the government wants to discourage consumption. Prices will then be set 
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relative prices on other goods and services, and with a neutral stand one would 
expect inflation on this component to follow headline inflation. However, that 
will be a political decision and the inflation of this component will not depend 
on the interest rate. 
Tobacco and wine are exclusively imported as well as most liquor and some 
beer. The exchange rate could influence prices in the short-term. I would not 
expect any long term effect since the effects from the exchange rate can be 
offset by politicians. 
 
5.3  Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair and 
Clothing and Footwear 
 
I will treat these two components combined. The direct effect on these 
components will be how monetary policy influences the exchange rate, and the 
subsequent pass-through to consumer prices. According to the estimates in 
Table 1the exchange rate pass-through of these components are the largest in the 
sample with the exception of cars. 
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5.4  Housing, Electricity and Fuel   
 
This component is comprised of several subcomponents. The most important is, 
with weights as of august 2013 
Component Weigth in CPI as % of total 
Renters rent                                                            3.12 
Renters rent, cabins                                                0.38 
Home owner's equivalent rent                               12.57 
Imputed rent, cabins                                             0.29 
Electricity, including grid rent                              3.8 
Fuel   0.32 
 
The main focus will be on the component of home owner's equivalent rent. 
Norway uses home owners' equivalent rent when computing KPI, following a 
methodology similar to the US. Acquisition of dwellings is considered 
investment, while rent is considered consumption. To compute the CPI rent is 
estimated for renters and imputed for home-owners. That is, impute the rent the 
home would be rented for in the free market. It is mostly agreed upon that an 
inflation index should ideally contain only components which are the product of 
monetary transactions. Indeed the ECB uses Harmonized indices of consumer 
prices when conducting monetary policy, excluding the housing sector. This is 
partly since housing markets differ from country to country because of 
regulation, home-ownership ratio among others. The most common alternative 
to imputed rent is user-cost. However, since the interest rate is both included in 
user cost and the goal for monetary policy, inflation will increase directly when 
interest rates increase. Hence this measure will not be suitable under the regime 
of inflation targeting. The problem with imputing rent is in Norway, as in the 
US, that the rental market is small compared to the home-owner market. The 
 
 
32 
 
two markets differ in composition of the dwellings, such as size, household size 
and type of dwellings. We will also look into the transmission mechanism from 
monetary prices to the rental market, the extent Norges Bank can actually impact 
rental prices through monetary policy, and with which lag. Rental prices is partly 
detached from house prices, the latter important for residential investment. A 
closer look at the housing component  will show that it is possible that a rise in 
interest rates may lead to higher inflation, and hence higher interest rates .One 
can conclude that owners' equivalent rent may be well suited for a cost-of-living 
index, but less so for a  inflation target. 
Nesbakken (2008) notes that there are huge differences between renters and 
owners in the characteristics of households and the dwellings they live in. This 
makes it hard to know how the accuracy of home-owners imputed rent. Low 
income groups tend to be overrepresented among renters. The smaller the 
household, the more likely it will be a renter. Younger people are also more 
likely to rent. Home-owners tend to have larger homes than renters. In Norway 
the market for renters differs not only in characteristics, but is also rather thin 
compared to the market for home-owners. To estimate owners' equivalent rent 
SSB uses location, size, type of dwellings, surroundings, number of rooms, and 
quality of the dwellings amongst others. The result also depends on the 
methodology for the weights for owners' equivalent rent. All this makes it 
difficult to impute owners' equivalent rent; however, I have no reason to believe 
that the estimates are not fairly accurate. The use of imputed rent in an inflation 
index can still of course be judged on a matter of principle. We will conclude 
that it is problematic, but still is dwarfed by the potential problems arising from 
the transmission mechanism. 
 
The transmission mechanism from monetary policy to the housing component of 
CPI inflation is not clear. For housing the mechanism is clearer. Sørensen and 
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Whitta-Jacobsen (2010) notes that supply of housing is fixed in the short run, 
hence prices are determined by demand. The factors determining demand is 
income, the real interest rate and expected appreciation, with the two latter 
probably the most volatile. If prices are above replacement cost we would 
expect over time investments in housing will increase supply. As we have seen, 
this is an important component of the volatile investment component in GDP 
and a leading indicator for the business cycle. According to Case et al (2005) 
there is also a strong wealth effect from housing prices, more so than for other 
asset classes, like stocks, which further contributes to aggregate demand. 
Considering how the housing component of the CPI is calculated, it is only those 
secondary effects on housing prices that will influence inflation via increased 
aggregate demand. Rents are partly detached from the development in housing 
prices. I will explore the possibility that monetary policy do not influence rentals 
in the desired direction, at least not in the medium term. 
Papadimetreou and Wray (1996) give some examples of how the transmission 
mechanism works in the case of the housing component. First they note, “that 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy operates to a great extent 
through the housing sector: higher interest rates raise construction finance cost 
and reduce supply, while higher mortgage rates discourage demand. As the 
housing sector slows, so does the whole economy”. However, they note that the 
housing component of the CPI, which will be the case with KPI as well, do not 
capture inflation in the housing sector as measured by house prices. They claim 
that this would not be a big problem if the housing component was a small part 
of the CPI, but as in Norway it is a relatively large part, and as in Norway 
accounts for much of the weighted contribution to the CPI. They also note that it 
is possible that a limited supply of rentals relative to demand, the rental price of 
single-family detached housing rises rapidly, which would lead to a high rate of 
inflation for residential and imputed owners' equivalent rent. Also, that this can 
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occur independently of changes in price of those houses, and of quantity, or cost 
of current construction of such housing. This would lead the FED to tighten 
monetary policy, which could cause those considering buying such homes to 
postpone the purchase because of higher interest rates. This would force them to 
rent, putting upward pressure on the price of rentals. Tight policy then leads to 
higher inflation, and hence, higher interest rates. Landlords in turn might try to 
pass on higher interest costs on the tenants. The authors are aware that this is not 
a sustainable condition, and in the end something has to give. However, it 
illustrates possible problems arising from the housing component of the CPI. 
 
They also gave an early warning of what could happen in a speculative boom, 
while at the same time the rental market is not particularly congested. They 
claim that such a situation would warrant tighter monetary policy to curb rapid 
increasing prices of new and used houses. And note that, “the inflationary 
pressures in the housing market will not be captured in the CPI until the normal 
rate of transition of detached housing from owner-occupancy to rental plus the 
normal rate of turnover in the rental market (due to construction of new units 
and razzing of old units) led to higher rental prices or until bottlenecks force 
prospective homeowners into the rental market”. They believe that there is a link 
between monetary policy and the housing sector, mainly due to the impact of 
interest rates on new construction and of mortgage rates on housing demand. 
These links is such that actual cost increases will translate into inflation rates in 
an indirect manner. They conclude that there is no reason to suppose that 
inflation as measured by the CPI accurately reflects market conditions for 
owner-occupied housing. We note that this description is not that far from what 
has happened in Norway and other developed countries, in the years after their 
article was written. In Norway prices for apartments and houses are at an all-
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time high, after a strong rebound after house prices fell during the height of the 
financial crisis. 
 
The subcomponent of Electricity and grid rental is, as the component of fuel, 
rather volatile. Hence it is excluded from KPIJAE. The price of grid rental is 
determined partly by the government. It is supposed to cover the costs of the 
electricity companies building and operating their grid, as well as allowing them 
some profit on their capital. The grid rental is calculated in three steps. First the 
government decides the income to the company that owns the grid. Then the 
company estimates the consumption of their customers in Kwh. Finally one 
divides to find grid rental per Kwh. If the estimate proves to be wrong, the grid 
rental is changed so total income corresponds to the value in step one. Grid 
rental is independent of consumption so if consumption is low grid rental 
increases, and vice versa. That implies that grid rental increases volatility in 
prices, conditioned that lower consumption is caused by lower production. This 
is an example of politically determined prices which the central bank has no 
direct control over. In fact, prices of grid rental will increase when interest goes 
up because it raises the cost of capital. 
 
5.5  Healthcare 
 
The subcomponents of Healthcare are medical products, glasses, medical 
services, paramedical services and dental services outside of institutions. 
Healthcare in Norway is mainly publicly financed. Hence most of the prices of 
healthcare consist of politically determined prices. Costs to the consumer of 
medical services and medical products are user fees. For medical products the 
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consumer pays full prize, however, after a certain expenditure threshold have 
been reached the patient will pay a user fee for the rest of his consumption. 
 
5.6  Transport   
 
As with the component for housing the characteristics of the subcomponents of 
the transport components are have a different nature. Most notably, as the 
housing sector, it consists of an energy component. For that reason I will also 
decompose this component into its parts and corresponding weights as of 
August 2013: 
 
Component Weigth in CPI as % of total 
Cars   4.79 
Motorbikes 0.26 
Bikes   0.26 
Spare parts and accessories                                                                           0.56 
 
Fuel and lubricants                                                                                        2.91 
 
Maintenance and auto repair                                                                        2.27 
Other Services connected to private use of 
transport                                    
0.95 
Passenger travel by train, metro or electric tram                                          0.37
Passenger transport by road                                                                          1.09 
Passenger travel by air                                                                                  0.77
Passenger travel by boat                                                                                0.56
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Cars and motorbikes are exclusively imported; hence their price depends on the 
price of the Norwegian krone and on pass-through. Cars have the largest pass-
through of the sample in Table 1. 
Fuel and lubricants are, as mentioned, excluded from the core inflation measure 
KPIJAE because of its volatility. 
Passenger travel in Norway will in most cases be subsidized and regulated by 
public authorities. Sometimes private companies compete for public contracts, 
or the public sector will provide the services by themselves. Nonetheless, the 
price paid by the consumer will usually not cover the true cost of the service. 
One subcomponent of particular interest is passenger travel by air because of its 
high volatility. In 2007 SSB made a change in the methodology that caused 
volatility to increase dramatically. In short, as described by Johansen (2007), 
airliners sell tickets based on different booking classes, which have different 
prices. Each class has its own base rate. Before 2007 SSB tracked the change 
price in the base rate, however this is only correct if the different classes differ in 
quality. The categories that would obviously differ in quality are if the tickets are 
flexible or non-flexible. SSB tracks non-flexible tickets, since that are the choice 
of most consumers. There are, however, several booking classes within those 
two categories, which only one is available at a point in time that have a 
different base rate. Since the CPI is supposed to reflect what consumers actually 
pays for goods and services SSB decided to change their methodology, 
withstanding the higher volatility. To take into account the changing prices SSB 
started to track prices for each flight three months in advance, then gradually 
following up with shorter intervals as time passes. Because of the high volatility 
this subcomponent can heavily influence CPI inflation even though its weight is 
relatively small with 0.77% of the total. As a side note, even if energy is 
excluded from measures of core inflation they still influence prices in a variety 
of products. Derivatives of Petroleum are found in the strangest products, so 
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even if energy is excluded costs, and presumably prices will, be affected by 
changes in the price of oil. This is particularly obvious in the case of flights, 
since fuel is a large cost for airliners.    
 
5.7  Postal and Telecommunications Services 
 
The Postal Office in Norway has a monopoly in delivering letter and packages 
subjected to limitations in price and weight. The prices the Postal Office wants 
to charge must be approved by the government. Prices are then determined by 
the state. The weight is rather small; the most recent weight is only 0.07%. 
 
5.8  Culture and Leisure 
 
This component consists of 17 subcomponents, so even if the main component 
has a current weight of 12.72 percent each of the subcomponents are rather 
small. I will only focus on a few of them which are particularly interesting. 
Two of the subcomponents consists of audio visional and IT equipment. Most of 
which is imported. 
Books are a small component of KPI, currently only, 0.66% of the total. 
However, after SSB changed its methodology for books in 2007 to get in line 
with guidelines from Eurostrat, volatility have increased to an extent so this 
subcomponent have the potential to massively influence headline inflation. The 
technicalities are somewhat tedious and will not be explored in detail. Suffice to 
say that one of the reasons for the volatility is increased seasonality in prices. 
SSB divided the books into different categories; within the categories they 
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compare price changes from month to month, where the selection within each 
month varies  
5.9  Education   
 
This component consists of politically determined user fees for public education 
and costs of private education. The latter carrying most weight in this 
component.  
 
5.10  Hotel- and Restaurant services   
 
This component is labor intensive and hence will likely track inflation of wage 
growth.  
 
5.11  Other Goods and Services    
 
This component consists of several subcomponents ranging from Haircuts and 
Beauty Care, Social Care and Insurance, Financial Services and Toiletries as the 
most important. Hence the characteristics of the subcomponents are quite 
different. 
Haircuts and Beauty Care is labor intensive would likely have inflation tracking 
wage growth. We also note that Social Care, which among other consist of user 
fees for children in kindergarten.  This is another example of politically 
determined prices. 
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5.12  Conclusion 
 
Books and Passenger travel by air should be considered to be excluded from the 
measures of core inflation because of their volatility. However, they will be 
likely candidates to be removed from the trimmed mean, and hence, the trimmed 
median as well. If their weights were larger I would guess they would be 
removed from all measures of core inflation. 
Home owner's equivalent rent and imputed rent for cabins combined accounts 
for 12.86 percent of KPI. We have seen that beside of the methodological 
problems with imputed rents, monetary policy might not influence these 
components, or in the worst case inflation of these components might rise in 
tandem with the interest rates. I will again emphasis that over the long-run the 
central bank will affect all components. When I have written that Norges Bank 
cannot influence the components it is meant to be understood over the medium-
term 
Prices largely controlled by the government consist of about 10 percent of KPI. 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages combined with Alcoholic beverages and 
tobacco consists of 17.41 percent of the consumer price index.   
In the short-run one could assume that exchange rate volatility is beyond the 
control of the government. This affects a large part of KPI, however, the effect 
on consumer prices is muted by slow exchange rate pass-through. 
 
6  Weighted Contribution from the Components 
 
Papadimetrou and Wray (1996) recommended excluding components beyond 
the control of the central bank as a measure inflation target. The reason they 
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suggested excluding those components is because if most of the inflation 
originates from such components the central bank must use tight monetary 
policy to ensure inflation is low enough in the components they can control to 
hit its overall target. This they claim will hurt the economy. If inflation in 
components the central bank controls were high, it could be conceivable that 
that monetary policy could be too loose. They do not consider this scenario; 
probably because they seem to believe that moderate inflation below 8 percent 
do not hurt economic growth. I will also check if the components that Norges 
Bank can control have decreased in importance. I find that in the eighties most 
of the contribution came from the goods sector, but now stems mostly from the 
service sector. Monetary theory suggests that interest rate changes impact the 
goods sector more than the service sector. The contribution from the Housing 
sector has increased a lot over the years as well. 
I have calculated the weighted contribution to inflation from each component. 
The weighted contribution is found by taking the one-year change of the index 
for each component, multiplying by the appropriate component weight, and 
dividing by the change of the overall KPI. I have calculated inflation in each 
component and KPI by using their respective indexes from December to 
December each year. The weights were changed in August each year until 2009 
complicating the procedure somewhat; the method is explained by Statistics 
Norway (2013). I have calculated the weighted contribution from each 
component of the KPI and the delivery sector since 1980. Selected components 
are presented in Appendix D. Ideally I would have taken out all the components 
in KPI that is imputed or politically determined. Unfortunately this is not 
possible because I do not have access to the weights and indexes for all of the 
subcomponents. 
Figure 2 to 5 are taken from the KPI for the delivery sector. I note from Figure 3 
that the goods sector has declined in importance. Figure 2 indicates that some of 
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this effect is due to appreciation of the Norwegian krone. Norges Bank can 
control the exchange rate as shown, at least to a certain extent. From Figure 5 it 
seems like the contribution from domestic produced goods have declined 
somewhat in importance, also the contribution has become more volatile. The 
weighted contribution from rent and imputed rent has shown a steady increase, 
especially after inception of inflation targeting.    
 
Figure 2. Weighted Contribution Imported Goods and Domestic Goods and 
Services  
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Figure 3. Weighted Contribution Goods and Services 
 
Note: For 2011 the contribution from the service sector was 563 percent and 463 
percent from the goods sector. I have set 100 for the service sector and 0 for the 
goods sector for that year. 
 
Figure 4. Weighted Contribution Rent and Imputed Rent, Including 
Vacation Homes 
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Figure 5. Weighted Contribution to inflation from Domestic Produced 
Goods, except Fish and Agricultural Products 
 
 
 
The weighted contribution from the Housing and Transport components have 
steadily increased over the years and after 1999 tends to dominate headline 
inflation. I have shown that Norges Bank have limited influence over the 
Housing component and largely controls the Transport sector via its influence 
over the exchange rate. 
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Figure 6. Weighted Contribution to inflation from the Housing and 
Transport Sector 
 
Note: The weighted contribution from the Housing and Transport component 
was -443 and 98 respectively in 2011. I set that to -100 for the scale to not blow 
out. 
 
Looking at Table X I note that headline inflation has been below the target on 
average. This indicates tight monetary policy for at least parts of the period. Had 
it not been for inflation from the Housing component inflation would have been 
lower still.  
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Table 6. Average Inflation for the components over the period January 
1999- June 2013 
Components  Inflation 
Education 4,01 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              3,76 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  3,46 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  3,29 
Other Goods and Services                                                       2,67 
Transport 2,66 
KPI 1,98 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            1,46 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 1,08 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              0,27 
Healthcare  -0,01 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -2,87 
Clothing and footwear                                                              -4,36 
Source: Indexes taken from Statistics Norway, based on my own calculations. 
Over the period Postal and Telecommunications services and Clothing and 
footwear have experienced deflation. This is most probably not because of tight 
monetary policy. The main reason for the fall in prices Postal and 
Telecommunications services is technological improvements. For Clothing and 
footwear the main reasons are shift in imports from low-cost producers, 
competition among retailers and abandonment of tariffs and quotas. Changes in 
relative prices are not prohibited under inflation targeting. This is normal in a 
well-functioning capitalist economy. I would be reluctant to claim that deflation 
in parts of the components has been a problem under inflation targeting. 
However, parts of Papadimetrou and Wray’s critique are valid because tight 
monetary policy seems to have been masked by a rise in components the central 
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bank has limited control over. Most notably the Housing component, but also 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products and to some extent the Transport 
sector.  
The method by Papadimetrou and Wray has some drawbacks. First of all it is 
not defined when headline inflation is zero. Second, if headline inflation is very 
low, some of the components can have very large weighted contribution without 
necessarily having inflation being out of line. I note from the figure that except 
for 2008 and 2009 the Housing and Transportation components for the most part 
determined headline inflation.  
  
Figure 7. Headline Inflation and the contribution from Housing and 
Transportation sector                       
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As noted Norges Bank controls parts of the Housing component and the 
Transport component mainly through the exchange rate channel. The figure still 
warns of what could happen in the scenario described in the paragraph of Fiscal 
policy, a situation with low economic activity combined with a strong krone. In 
such a situation it is conceivable that rent increases stall for a period. Figure 7 
suggests strong deflationary pressures would be likely. 
 
7  Monetary Regimes in Norway over the period 1979-2013 
 
In analyzing inflation it makes sense in looking at periods with different 
monetary regimes separately. A central bank deserves to be judged on its 
conduct based on its objectives at the time. It is also interesting to compare 
level, stationary and persistence of inflation in light of regime shifts. Another 
possible approach is to look for structural breaks in inflation. Even if it would be 
interesting to see if they would correspond with the regime changes, I have 
chosen not to do so. This is because I believe that structural breaks mostly are 
determined by international factors, forces strong enough to triumph domestic 
policies. Suffice to say that events from abroad seem to have influenced 
domestic inflation rates, which in turn have influenced the corresponding regime 
change. 
I will divide the monetary regimes into four periods. The discussion below is 
based on Klunde (2011). Norway devalued for the last time on the 10. December 
1992 and it marked the end of fixed exchange rates in Norway. The period of 
fixed exchange rate will be divided into two periods. Before the fall of 1986 the 
interest rate was determined politically by the treasury. However, ever since, 
Norges Bank has determined the short term interest rate. This decision was 
prompted by the devaluation of 1986. The treasury had a history of setting the 
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interest rate so low that intervention in the foreign exchange market was 
necessary to defend the targeted value of the Norwegian krone. In 1986 these 
interventions became too costly, while at the same time falling oil prices added 
pressure on the krone. The subsequent transfer of power to determine interest 
rates to the central bank was made to put relief on the central banks foreign 
reserves by relying on the interest rate to defend the fixed exchange rate. 
Formally the krone was pegged to a trade weighted basket of foreign currencies 
from December 1978 until October 1990. From October 1990 until December 
1992 it was pegged to the ECU. 
After the devaluation of 1986, Norway did not devalue again until December 
1992. This meant the end of fixed exchange rate for the Norwegian krone. 
Formally the krone floated from December 1992 until May 1994. During this 
period it was intended to re-peg the krone as soon as international conditions 
would permit, but that never happened. From May 1994 until March 2001 
Norges Bank was supposed to keep the krone stable against a basket of 
European currencies, using interventions if necessary. Using the target of the peg 
it abandoned in 1992 as the focal point. This was relatively successful, as the 
krone was quite stable over the period. The period from January 1992 until 
December 1998 can be characterized as a dirty float, where they tolerated 
swings of 15 percent from the target. 
 I will still consider the krone to be floating during that time, since there was not 
any explicit target for the exchange rate of the krone. It could be interpreted that 
if the krone had been severely tested, Norges Bank would not have defended the 
krone with any pervasion. Instead the central bank was looking for the krone to 
return to its past value after the dust settled. I have chosen to divide the period 
with floating exchange rate into two periods, before and after inflation targeting. 
The inflation target was officially introduced in March 2001, however, for 
practical purposes it can be argued that Norway de facto introduced inflation 
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targeting with the appointment of Svein Gjedrem as the head of Norges Bank in 
January 1999. Gjedrem was a firm proponent of inflation targeting. He believed 
that to achieve the goal of a stable, yet floating, krone against European 
currencies Norwegian inflation needed to converge to that of those countries, 
Gjedrem (2000). While hardly controversial, this marked a regime shift in the 
sense that interest rates became the sole instrument for the central bank, even 
before inflation targeting was officially introduced in March 2001. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the central bank ceased to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market after January 1999. 
During the first period, the treasury would determine interest rates. The interest 
rate was, as mentioned, set effectively too low to defend the exchange rate. As 
one would suspect monetary and fiscal policy could be to accommodate 
inflation to satisfy popular demand. To regain competitiveness Norway devalued 
several times during this period, either outright as in 1986, or by changing the 
weights in the basket of currencies in the peg. This indicates that inflation was 
too high compared with the countries in the peg. The depreciation of the krone 
would further increase the rate of inflation. In such a regime one would guess 
inflation expectations to be rather high. When a country pegs its currency to 
other currencies it loses a lot of freedom in setting interest rates and pursuing 
fiscal policy. As commonly known, over time the country can have no higher 
inflation than the country, or countries, which its currency is pegged to. That is, 
it can as long as it has foreign reserves. We would expect that during this period 
of relatively accommodative policies, that inflation persistence would be quite 
high and inflation possibly to have been non-stationary. 
After Norges Bank was given the task of defending the exchange rate of the 
krone through the use of the interest rate one would expect inflation to subside. 
That is relatively to the previous regime, taken developments of foreign inflation 
into account. A burst of inflation from abroad would probably have led to higher 
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inflation in Norway as well. However, one would expect domestic inflation to 
converge to that of the countries in the currency basket. As the central bank 
would presumably crack harder down on inflation threats, one would expect 
persistence to be lower and inflation to be stationary, compared to the previous 
period. That should be true regardless of the level of inflation. KPI inflation fell 
from 8.4 percent to 4.5 percent from the first to second period, data is found in 
Appendix E. 
 
After the krone started floating in the third period inflation fell further to slightly 
above 2 percent. This fall would probably not have occurred had it not been for 
fall in German inflation of that period. For all the first three periods domestic 
inflation in Norway would be contingent on foreign inflation because of 
exchange rate and monetary regime, where Germany being the most important 
country.  It is only in the last regime of inflation targeting that domestic inflation 
can be allowed to deviate from foreign inflation without eventually leading to 
the collapse of the regime. Obviously, domestic inflation is meant to deviate 
from foreign inflation in the case the latter deviates from the inflation target. 
 
8  Persistence and Unit Roots in Inflation 
 
If a central bank successfully targets inflation, implicitly or explicitly, then 
inflation should be stationary around that target, hence have a unit root. Inflation 
persistence determines the speed which inflation returns to its mean, or 
equivalently, how permanent or temporary are shocks to inflation. Under 
inflation targeting the means corresponds to the target. If inflation contains a 
unit root, it will not have a tendency to return to its mean. Hence, that inflation 
does not contain a unit root is a prerequisite for inflation targeting to succeed, 
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and inflation persistence measures the lag, or speed, in which inflation return to 
its mean. If the central bank is having control over the rate of inflation, headline 
inflation should be stationary around the target, combined with low volatility. 
The absence of a unit root, however, is only a necessary, not sufficient, condition 
to conclude a central bank can control inflation via the interest rate. This is 
because other explanations for stationary inflation are possible. I have checked if 
the components of the Norwegian CPI index, as well as the aggregate index, are 
stationary. This is to indicate if there are components that are non-stationary, 
indicating that Norges Bank may have limited control over those. If the time 
series of an index is non-stationary it is following a random walk. This should 
not be interpreted as if fiscal and monetary policy cannot influence this 
component in the long run. Inflation cannot increase independently of policy 
giving a boost to aggregate demand or is accommodative towards supply shocks. 
However, Norges Bank targets inflation over the medium term, approximately 
two years. If a component contains a unit root this implies that Norges Bank 
cannot influence the component during the target period. One would guess that 
monetary policy can become tight enough to influence all components; however 
targeting non-stationary components will probably mean that the components 
already stationary will undergo severe deflation in such a scenario. I will also 
look at inflation persistence for each of the components and in the aggregate. 
Further I will divide the period from 1978 until today into four different time 
periods, motivated by changes in monetary regimes suggest by the previous 
paragraph. 
 
I will start out with definitions of inflation persistence; continue with measures 
of inflation persistence and unit root tests. I will follow up with a short 
discussion of research of inflation persistence, including international 
experiences with inflation persistence during different monetary regimes. To 
conclude I provide my own results of inflation persistence and unit root tests in 
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Norway. The results show inflation persistence to have fallen over time. Under 
inflation targeting most of the components are stationary, as well as in the 
aggregate. This indicates that inflation targeting has been largely successful in 
bringing down. I attribute this success to anchoring of inflation expectations. 
 
8.1  Definitions and Measures of Inflation Persistence 
 
Fuhrer (2009) points to two types of inflation persistence, Reduced-form 
persistence and Structural persistence. Reduced-form persistence refers to the 
empirical property of an observed inflation measure, without economic 
interpretation. Structural persistence refers to persistence that arises from 
identified economic sources. He divides these sources into three types: 
-those generated by the driving process 
-those that are a part of the inflation process intrinsic to inflation (that is, 
persistence that is imparted to inflation independent of the driving process) 
-those that are induced by its own actions or communications. 
 
He argues that no single definitive measure of reduced-form persistence exists. 
Researches have employed a variety of measures to capture the idea that 
inflation gradually responds to shocks. This definition implicitly assumes that 
inflation is positively correlated with its own lags. Some researchers define 
persistence as the extent to which shocks in the past have an effect on current 
inflation. 
 
Willis (2003) defines persistence as the “speed with which inflation returns to 
baseline after a shock. 
 
Batini and Nelson (2002) have three definitions of inflation persistence, which 
hints to possible measures of inflation persistence: 
 
 
54 
 
-positive serial correlation in inflation 
-lags between systematic monetary policy and their (peak) effect on inflation 
-Lagged responses of inflation to non-systematic policy actions (i.e. policy 
shocks) 
 
Marques, to paraphrase, claim that these definitions, except the first one, deals 
with speed of the response to inflation to a shock. If speed is low, inflation is 
persistent and if speed is high, it is not persistent. An important implication on 
the above definition of persistence is that any estimate of inflation persistence is 
conditional on the assumed long-run inflation path. In order to tell whether 
inflation is moving quickly or slowly in response to a shock, we need 
information on the path inflation would have followed had the shock not 
occurred. He claims this has been mostly ignored in the literature, where it is 
assumed that there is a constant long-run level of inflation when computing 
estimates of persistence. Marques points to exceptions, for instance Bleany 
(2001), Levin and Piger (2003) and Burdekin and Syklos (1999), which allows 
for the possibility of breaks in the mean of inflation. Evaluating inflation 
persistence amounts to find an answer to the question: how slowly does the 
inflation converge for the exogenous central bank target in response to a shock? 
 
There certainly other definitions of inflation persistence, however, I trust I have 
been comprehensive enough to catch its spirit. I will focus this paper on 
Reduced-form persistence. 
 
Fuhrer (2009) lists a battery of measures of inflation persistence: 
-Conventional unit root tests 
-The autocorrelation function of the inflation series 
-The first autocorrelation of the inflation series 
-The dominant root of the univariate autoregressive inflation process 
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-The sum of the autoregressive coefficients for inflation 
-Unobserved components decompositions of inflation that estimate the 
  relative contributions of “permanent” and “transitory” components of 
  inflation. 
 
Marques suggest using half-life of persistence, which have the nice property of 
giving a time frame to persistence. He defines it as, “The number of periods for 
which the effect of a unit shock to inflation is above 0.5”. As mentioned above 
one could introduce structural breaks or trends in search for inflation persistence. 
 
8.2  Evidence of Inflation Persistence 
 
In this section I will look at evidence of inflation persistence. I will also look at 
inflation persistence during different monetary regimes, since this paper 
separates from different monetary regimes when looking at inflation persistence. 
I will also concentrate on reduced-form persistence. 
 
Many researchers find that inflation persistence has fallen since the seventies 
and eighties. Batini and Nelson (2002) find that serial correlation in the US fell 
from 0.626 in the period January 1965-December 1984, to 0.369 from January 
1985 until August 2001. For the UK it fell from 0.525 in the period January 
1965 until September 1992 to not significantly different from zero in the period 
from November 1992 until August 2001. Similarly Kuttner and Posen (2001) 
find that inflation targeting countries have experienced “large, significant 
reductions” in the autoregressive coefficient of monthly inflation. Benati (2008) 
also finds significant reductions in reduced-form inflation persistence in The US, 
UK, Canada and Euro-Area. CPI inflation persistence fell from 0.77 during the 
Great Inflation to 0.49 Post-Volcker. In Canada CPI inflation persistence fell 
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from 0.90 to -0.33 after inflation targeting was introduced. Similar declines 
happened in the UK and the Euro area. 
 
Other researchers have not found substantial evidence of decline of inflation 
persistence. The main reason seems to be different methodology, since the 
researchers have allowed for structural breaks in the mean of inflation. Marques 
points out that autoregressive persistence assumes constant mean. This makes 
inflation persistence sensitive to the time period chosen, unless one search for 
structural breaks in the mean of inflation. Marques argue for a time-varying 
mean of inflation. Not surprisingly, this will remove most of inflation 
persistence, even during the period of high and variable inflation as in the 
seventies. He subsequently does not find evidence of changes in inflation 
persistence over different periods. Levin and Piger (2004) use structural breaks 
to look for changes in the mean of inflation. Using CPI, PCE Price, Core CPI 
and GDP price inflation, most of the countries in the survey had a structural 
break in the mean of inflation during the early nineties. They find that allowing 
for a possible break in the mean, many of the inflation series exhibit very little 
persistence. They conclude that inflation persistence is not an inherent 
characteristic of industrial economies. 
 
The constraints for monetary and fiscal policy differ depending on if a country 
currency is pegged or if it floats. If inflation persistence is caused, at least partly, 
by accommodative monetary and fiscal policies, then a country with a floating 
exchange rate have larger scope to be accommodative towards inflation. If a 
country wants to maintain a peg it must be restrictive in monetary and fiscal 
policy. Hence, one would believe that inflation persistence is more a problem 
under floating rates. However, most exchange rates on a peg are eventually 
devalued, implying to loose monetary and/or fiscal policy to sustain the peg. 
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However, countries with floating exchange rate may have had a tight 
combination of monetary and fiscal policy as well. Bleaney (2001) claims that 
there is no evidence that monetary policy is more accommodative under floating 
rates, and cites Burdekin and Siklos (1999) that claims that changes in inflation 
persistence has changed for reasons unconnected with exchange-rate regime. He 
also notes that “the constraints of pegging the exchange rate have the effect of 
making inflation reflect the dynamics of the reserve currency”. Beside different 
constraints on monetary and fiscal policy under pegged and floating rates, 
Dornbusch (1982) showed the more the exchange rate accommodated inflation 
shocks, the more persistent these shocks were. Grytten and Hunnes (2009) have 
found that there was virtually no inflation persistence, combined with low 
inflation, in Scandinavia during the Gold Standard dating from 1874 until 1914. 
Batini (2002) looks at inflation persistence over the period1970-2000 in selected 
Euro area countries. He separates this period into two periods according to 
changes in monetary regimes. He concludes that, “The persistence of European 
inflation seems to have varied only marginally over the past thirty years, despite 
the numerous monetary policy regimes shifts occurred in Europe after the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system”. 
 
8.3  Results of Unit Root Test and Inflation Persistence 
 
I have tested for stationary inflation and reduced-form inflation persistence on 
monthly data for KPI and its twelve components. Ideally, I would have liked to 
run the tests on KPI-JAE; however, I choose to use KPI because of its longer 
time-span of data. I have seasonally adjusted all indexes using dummy variables. 
For the Unit Root test I have chosen the Augmented Dickey-Fuller, (ADF), test, 
mainly because it is the most commonly used test. As a measure of inflation 
persistence I have used the sum of the coefficients of the Auto-regressive 
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function. The time period is from January 1979 until June 2012. Further, I have 
divided these into four periods dependent on the monetary regimes described in 
a previous paragraph. I could have looked for structural breaks to see if they 
would correspond to the changes in monetary regimes. I have not done so 
because I would be careful with the economic meaning of such a break. Even if 
it occurred at the same time as the regime shift, it is possible that other factors 
lead to a structural break, which then prompted a regime shift. 
 
The formula for the ADF test is: 
∆ 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 ∆ 𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
The ADF test is a regression of the first difference of inflation over a constant, a 
trend term, lagged inflation, lagged first differences and a serially uncorrelated 
random error term. I have set 𝛽= 0. A trend term would suggest accelerating 
inflation, while I want to check for stationary inflation around a constant mean. 
The periods, even when looking at monthly data, is relatively short. This is a 
potential problem since the ADF test power is low on short time spans. A lot of 
the disagreement over stationary inflation is caused by researchers using 
different unit root tests. However, since unit roots tests in general have low 
power over short time spans and since I compare different time periods, I have 
decided that the ADF test is adequate. Over short time spans tests will err on the 
side of rejecting too few unit roots in the series. 
 
I use the method suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991) when selecting lag 
length, k. The procedure is to set an upper bound for k, k = 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥. If the last 
included lag has a t-value is significant at the 10 percent level, 1,645, choose 
that lag. Otherwise reduce k by one until the last lag is significant. It is common 
the use Akakie information criterion or the Schwartx criterion, however Ng and 
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Perron (1995) have shown that these methods tend consistently tend to choose to 
small k, especially when the sample size is finite. For k max I have set 18 for the 
period as a whole, 12 for the first three sub periods and 14 for the last sub 
period. This is loosely guided by Schwertz (1989), by choosing 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥 by the 
integer formula {C*(
𝑇
100
)(
1
𝑑
)
} with C= 12 and d = 4. This method is ad hoc, 
however quite common to use. 
 
I will use the sum of the coefficients, 𝜌, of the autoregressive function as a 
scalar measure for persistence. Where 𝜌 ≡ ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1  in the autoregressive 
function                                                   
       𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑  𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1  + 𝜀𝑡.  
This is maybe the most common measure. Andrews and Chen (1994), even though 
they advocate this measure, points to some potential problems. Two series could 
have the same value of 𝜌, however one of the series could have only positive 
values, while another could have vales that oscillates between positive and 
negative numbers. Likewise it is possible that two time series have the same 𝜌 
value where one of the series have large initial coefficients followed by a rapid 
decline, and one series that have smaller initial coefficients, but a slower decline. 
Marques points out that all measures of inflation that involves 𝜌 will likely have 
similar problems. For lag length I have chosen p+1, where p is the lag length of 
the ADF test. Then the p value will correspond to the coefficient of the lagged 
value of inflation in the ADF test plus one. I will consider the equivalent 
expression: 
∆ 𝑡 = 𝜇  (𝜌 − 1) 𝑡−1+ ∑ ∆ 𝑡−𝑗
𝑘−1
𝑗=1  + 𝜀𝑡 
Then the scalar measure of persistence will correspond to the coefficient in the 
ADF test plus one. In general, by construction, the aggregate index tends to be 
more persistent than its components.  
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Not surprisingly the mean of headline inflation have fallen over the time 
periods. The inflation rates are summarized in Appendix C. When the treasury 
controlled the interest rate average inflation was 8.4 percent, it fell to 4.5 percent 
after the control of the interest rate was handed over to Norges Bank. After the 
krone started floating inflation fell to slightly above 2 percent, while after the 
inflation target was introduced it fell further, however insignificant, to slightly 
under 2 percent. 
 
Details of the unit root tests and persistence can be found in appendix A and B. 
A short version is shown in this table X. The coefficients are persistence and a 
star indicates if the component was stationary at the 5 percent level during the 
period. The components are ranked by the sum of persistence during the sub 
periods, which is the last entry in table 7. 
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Table 7. Inflation Persistence and Unit Root tests on components of KPI  
 
Components 79-13 79-86 86-92 93-98 99-13 Sum  
Furniture, Appliances and 
Household Goods Repair             
0,85 0,49 0,76 -0,14 0,43 1,54 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  0,71* 0,50 0,03* 0,80 0,01 1,34 
Other Goods and Services                                                       0,72 0,08* 0,51 0,37 0,35* 1,31 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                           0,70 0,37 0,64 0,37* -0,19* 1,19 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  0,39* 0,85 0,92 0,00 -0,66* 1,10 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 0,81 0,28 0,77 -0,14 0,16 1,06 
KPI 0,81 0,73 0,83 -0,17* -0,50* 0,90 
Education 0,26* -0,04* 0,22* -0,03* 0,30 0,46 
Clothing and footwear                                                              0,77 0,37 0,77 -0,40 -0,43* 0,31 
Postal and Telecommunications 
services                                
0,57 0,16 0,47 -0,07 -0,34* 0,22 
Transport 0,51* 0,59 0,01* -0,29 -0,47* -0,15 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 
products                             
0,40* 0,26 -0,27* -0,39* -0,07* -0,47 
Healthcare  0,04* 0,02* -0,12* -0,28* -0,35* -0,73 
 
 
For the period as a whole, from January 1979 until March 2013 all components, 
including headline KPI, have persistence significantly different from zero, 
except for Healthcare, Education and Food and non-alcohol beverages. As 
mentioned, this likely reflects changes in the mean of inflation for each 
component. More interesting I find evidence of declining inflation persistence 
for KPI from 0.71 and 0.66 in the two periods with fixed exchange rate to not 
significant different from zero after the krone started to float. Not surprisingly, 
this is reflected in the inflation persistence of the individual components. In the 
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last period of inflation targeting only Postal and Telecommunications and Food 
and non-alcohol beverages have inflation persistence significantly at the 5 
percent level of -0.33 and -0.19 respectively. This is down from the previous 
period, where seven components showed sign of inflation persistence. A 
reflection of the success of inflation targeting perhaps, however one must keep 
in mind that other explanations for this decline is probable. However, it is likely 
that inflation targeting is at least partly responsible for this decline. I note, 
however that inflation persistence decreased considerably even in the third 
period when the krone started floating.  
 
By inspection of the t-values over the periods I note that they also indicate that 
the components have become more stationary. I  note that the first and second 
period had seven components with a t-value of under -2, the third period 5 and 
the last period none.  
 
We note that the Housing component, while stationary, have a mean of 3.46 in 
the period after January 1999. As seen in the table of weighted contribution to 
the headline inflation, housing inflation has been larger, and in some years 
dominating the contribution, than its corresponding weight would suggest. This 
has helped Norges Bank to keep headline inflation closer to its target, since 
inflation has been below the target most of the time. However, one could claim 
that this is because of luck, instead of policy if Norges Bank has limited control 
over this component. This is something to keep in mind in case of potential 
problems in the future of controlling inflation. 
 
Since my measure of inflation persistence and unit root tests are closely related, 
the results of the unit root tests follows a similar pattern. Results are shown in 
appendix B. I note that the KPI is stationary only in the last to periods with 
floating exchange rate. It is not stationary during the whole period from 
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January1979 until today either. I also note that there is a clear tendency of more 
components becoming stationary from period to period, with the notable 
exception from periods two to three. In the last period all but four of the 
components are stationary. The absolute t-values for the components that are not 
stationary are also high compared to previous periods. 
 
9  Conclusion 
 
Norges Bank can control inflation via monetary policy. Moderate inflation 
pressure will likely be easily contained by interest increases. However, current 
short-term interest rates are at 1.5 percent. Hence, monetary policy has present 
limited scope of inflating the economy if subjected to deflationary forces. 
Norges Bank has limited control over some components in KPI. Most notably 
rent and imputed rent in the housing component. This violates that components 
in the CPI should be determined by market forces. Some prices are fully or 
partly politically determined. Some components are controlled mainly via the 
exchange rate channel. Evidence suggests that Norges Bank likely can control 
the exchange rate via the interest rate. If interest rates reach the zero bound 
Norges Bank will no longer be able to weaken the krone by interest policy. This 
might lead them to lose control over the exchange rate channel. That is, they will 
no longer be able to depreciate the krone by reducing interest rates. 
If most of the weighted contribution to inflation comes from components outside 
the control of Norges Bank, this could lead to overly tight monetary policy, 
since it must then lower inflation in the components it can control. I found that 
this has been a factor in Norway, combined with the fact that inflation has 
generally been slightly below the target on average. Most notable is the large 
weighted contribution from imputed rents. However, this effect has not been 
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dramatic and should rather be seen as a warning of potential problems to come. 
Further there is some evidence that the components which Norges Bank can 
control, have declined in importance. Weighted contribution to inflation has 
shifted from coming largely from the goods sector to the service sector. 
Monetary policy has most likely the largest effect on the former. Larger than 
average inflation from the housing sector have over time increased its weights in 
KPI, hence further increasing its importance.   
A prerequisite for inflation targeting to succeed is that headline inflation is 
stationary around the target. In Norway KPI has been stationary around about 
two percent inflation. Slightly less than the target, but must be considered 
largely successful. The individual components can have average inflation which 
differs from the target, however if Norges Bank influence those components by 
monetary policy they should preferably be stationary. I find that most of the 
components are now stationary as opposed to previous monetary regimes. I have 
also measured the components for inflation persistence which has decreased 
markedly as well. Lower inflation persistence shows that inflation return faster 
to baseline after a shock. I conclude that the above indicates that Norges Bank 
have been a successful inflation targeting central bank, and I attribute stationary 
inflation and lower persistence , both in the components and the aggregate, to 
anchored inflation expectations. 
Norges Bank should consider removing imputed rent and politically determined 
prices from the measure of both the indicator and target of inflation. Extremely 
volatile components like books and air travel should be considered to be 
removed from measures of core inflation.  
If in the future monetary policy shows inadequate to create inflation a more 
aggressive fiscal policy is recommended. That is, to increase the government 
deficit in Norwegian kroner. Possible more than what most observers would 
think of as compatible with HR. The same would be the case confronted with 
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inflationary pressure. Then the deficit in Norwegian kroner may be allowed to 
move towards a surplus.  In the case of a inflationary deficit Norges Bank can 
use monetary policy to curb it. If the deficit is so small that it is deflationary 
there is not much the central bank can do to create inflation. 
Since the measures, the indicators and target of monetary policy have some 
flaws, Norges Bank could focus more on wage growth and the exchange rate. It 
is hard to imagine high inflation rates without being caused by either a wage-
price spiral or a markedly depreciation of the exchange rate. Since exchange rate 
pass-through takes years to play out, a longer horizon might be needed. The 
downside with looking at a longer horizon might be increased volatility in the 
short-term inflation rate. In general a longer horizon will reduce the problem of 
the central bank having limited control over the inflation of certain components 
in the medium-term. 
I have noted that the components react to monetary policy with different time-
lags. The speed at which headline inflation converges to core inflation depends 
on the persistence of components that contribute to most of the core inflation at 
a given point in time. A persistence-weighted measure of core inflation in the 
spirit of Cutler (2001) could improve the forecasting ability of Norges Bank 
while at the same time providing a more reliable time-frame. However, reduced 
inflation persistence has reduced the demand for such a measure.   
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APPENDICIES 
 
The data in the Appendix are taken from Statistics Norway’s database. All 
calculations are mine. The calculations were made on PcGive. 
Appendix A. Table Unit Root Tests on Seasonally adjusted 
Indexes. 
 
Period S. January 1979 until June 2013 
Component 𝜸𝝅𝒕−𝟏 t-value 𝜸 lag  
Healthcare  -0,95801 -5,206 17 ** 
Education -0,74307 -4,461 11 ** 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              -0,60301 -4,103 11 ** 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  -0,61312 -3,985 13 ** 
Transport -0,49273 -3,646 14 ** 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  -0,28777 -3,338 18 * 
Other Goods and Services                                                       -0,27949 -2,849 17  
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -0,43042 -2,746 17  
KPI -0,18882 -2,69 13  
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            -0,30253 -2,579 14  
Culture and Leisure                                                                 -0,19279 -2,5 11  
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              -0,15082 -2,096 17  
Clothing and footwear                                                              -0,23467 -1,906 17  
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Period 1.January 1979 until August 1986 
 
Component 𝜸𝝅𝒕−𝟏 t-value 𝜸 lag  
Education -1,03947    -9,133 0 ** 
Healthcare  -0,98164 -8,598 0 ** 
Other Goods and Services                                                       -0,92037 -3,899 4 ** 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            -0,63357 -2,338 9  
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              -0,74477 -2,19 11  
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  -0,50129 -2,105 5  
Culture and Leisure                                                                 -0,72413 -1,877 11  
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -0,84378 -1,83 11  
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              -0,51105 -1,776 11  
Transport -0,40865 -1,361 11  
KPI -0,26707 -1,336 12  
Clothing and footwear                                                              -0,55607 -1,248 11  
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  -0,15199 -0,6774 12  
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Period 2.September 1986 until December 1992 
 
Component 𝜸𝝅𝒕−𝟏 t-value 𝜸 lag  
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              -1,26517 -11,23 0 ** 
Healthcare  -1,11855 -9,851 0 ** 
Transport -0,98813 -5,767 2 ** 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  -0,971376 -5,082 2 ** 
Education -0,77526 -3,2 3 * 
Other Goods and Services                                                       -0,49395 -2,803 7  
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            -0,35993 -1,708 12  
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -0,53179 -1,472 11  
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              -0,23519 -1,425 11  
Culture and Leisure                                                                 -0,23067 -1,228 11  
KPI -0,16771 -1,119 11  
Clothing and footwear                                                              -0,23141 -0,7221 12  
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  -0,08313 -0,313 11  
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Period 3.January 1993 until December 1998 
 
Component 𝜸𝝅𝒕−𝟏 t-value 𝜸 lag  
Education -1,025921 -8,586 0 ** 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              -1,38754 -4,501 5 ** 
KPI -1,16706 -4,134 5 ** 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            -0,62929 -3,354 2 * 
Healthcare  -1,28152 -3,097 11 * 
Transport -1,28566 -2,748 11  
Clothing and footwear                                                              -1,39552 -2,338 11  
Culture and Leisure                                                                 -1,13915 -2,287 11  
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -1,066588 -1,867 11  
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              -1,14064 -1,8 12  
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  -1,00088 -1,725 11  
Other Goods and Services                                                       -0,62541 -1,582 11  
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  -0,19967 -0,5838 11  
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Period 4.January 1999 until June 2013 
 
Component 𝜸𝝅𝒕−𝟏 t-value 𝜸 lag  
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            -1,19171 -15,97 0 ** 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              -1,070301 -10,42 1 ** 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -1,33872 -8,313 3 ** 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  -1,66071 -4,778 12 ** 
KPI -1,50228 -4,325 12 ** 
Clothing and footwear                                                              -1,42756 -3,794 11 ** 
Healthcare  -1,35119 -3,61 12 ** 
Transport -1,46771 -3,056 14 * 
Other Goods and Services                                                       -0,64828 -2,899 11 * 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  -0,988944 -2,691 12  
Culture and Leisure                                                                 -0,84452 -2,591 11  
Education -0,70177 -2,557 11  
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              -0,5724 -2,184 11  
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A.6 Significance levels 
 
The components are listed in descending order depending on the t-value of the 
ADF test. ** indicates significance at the 1% level, * at the 5% level. 
t-values for the above tables ordered from 1 to 5: 
Period 5% 1% 
S -2.87 -3.45 
1 -2.90 -3.51 
2 -2,90 -3.52 
3 -2.90 -3.52 
4 -2.88 -3.52 
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Appendix B. Inflation Persistence. Seasonally adjusted 
Indexes. 
 
January 1979 until June 2013 
 
Component Persistence, 𝝆 lag 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              0,84918 17 
KPI 0,81118 13 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 0,80721 11 
Clothing and footwear                                                              0,76533 17 
Other Goods and Services                                                       0,72051 17 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  0,71223 18 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            0,69747 14 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                0,56958 17 
Transport 0,50727 14 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              0,39699 11 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  0,38688 13 
Education 0,25693 11 
Healthcare  0,041987 17 
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January 1979 until August 1986 
 
Component Persistence, 𝝆 lag 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  0,84801 12 
KPI 0,73293 12 
Transport 0,59135 11 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  0,49871 5 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              0,48895 11 
Clothing and footwear                                                              0,44393 11 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            0,36643 9 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 0,27587 11 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              0,25523 11 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                0,15622 11 
Other Goods and Services                                                       0,079693 4 
Healthcare  0,018359 0 
Education -0,039477 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
September 1986 until December 1992 
 
Component Persistence, 𝝆 lag 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  0,91687 11 
KPI 0,83229 11 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 0,76933 11 
Clothing and footwear                                                              0,76859 12 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              0,76481 11 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            0,64007 12 
Other Goods and Services                                                       0,50605 7 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                0,46821 11 
Education 0,22474 3 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  0,028624 2 
Transport 1,19E-02 2 
Healthcare  -0,11855 0 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              -0,26517 0 
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January 1993 until December 1998 
 
Component Persistence, 𝝆 lag 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  0,80033 11 
Other Goods and Services                                                       0,37459 11 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            0,37071 2 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  -0,00088 11 
Education -0,025921 0 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -0,066588 11 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 -0,13915 11 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              -0,14064 12 
KPI -0,16706 5 
Healthcare  -0,28152 11 
Transport -0,28566 11 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              -0,38754 5 
Clothing and footwear                                                              -0,39552 11 
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January 1999 until June 2013 
 
Component Persistence, 𝝆 lag 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              0,4276 11 
Other Goods and Services                                                       0,35172 11 
Education 0,29823 11 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 0,15548 11 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  0,011056 12 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              -0,070301 1 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            -0,19171 0 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -0,33872 3 
Healthcare  -0,35119 12 
Clothing and footwear                                                              -0,42756 11 
Transport -0,46771 14 
KPI -0,50228 12 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  -0,66071 12 
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Appendix C. Mean of Inflation for the Components over 
the Monetary Periods. 
 
January 1979 until June 2013 
 
Components Mean of inflation 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  0,095282 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              0,059424 
Education 0,052919 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  0,046793 
Other Goods and Services                                                       0,044976 
Transport 0,044433 
KPI 0,038767 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            0,036325 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 0,032171 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              0,026577 
Clothing and footwear                                                              0,006039 
Healthcare  4,63E-05 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -0,01512 
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January 1979 until August 1986 
 
Components Mean of inflation 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  0,10269 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              0,098831 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            0,093946 
Other Goods and Services                                                       0,089582 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  0,085069 
Transport 0,085065 
KPI 0,083934 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              0,081034 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 0,074566 
Education 0,069268 
Clothing and footwear                                                              0,064754 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                0,060179 
Healthcare  0,000417 
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September 1986 until December 1992 
 
Components Mean of inflation 
Education 0,071995 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              0,069001 
Clothing and footwear                                                              0,056119 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  0,054553 
Transport 0,053249 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  0,046753 
Other Goods and Services                                                       0,045735 
KPI 0,045009 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 0,043909 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              0,032269 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            0,028 
Healthcare  7,96E-05 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -0,04003 
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January 1993 until December 1998 
 
Components Mean of inflation 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              0,051813 
Education 0,042952 
Other Goods and Services                                                       0,031444 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  0,027279 
Transport 0,026333 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            0,024356 
KPI 0,020376 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  0,019259 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 0,017652 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              0,008671 
Healthcare  1,16E-18 
Clothing and footwear                                                              -0,00178 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -0,05226 
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January 1999 until June 2013 
 
Components Mean of inflation 
Education 0,040066 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              0,037555 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  0,034558 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  0,032942 
Other Goods and Services                                                       0,026659 
Transport 0,026588 
KPI 0,019769 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            0,014572 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 0,010821 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              0,002706 
Healthcare  -0,00015 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -0,02869 
Clothing and footwear                                                              -0,04361 
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Appendix D. Weighted Contribution from the Components. 
Weighted Contribution from the delivery sector. 
 
Year Goods Services Domestic 
Inflation 
Imported 
Goods 
Hous-
ing   
Trans-
port 
Rent 
1980 76 24 86 14 19 17 6 
1981 72 28 88 12 15 16 7 
1982 68 32 82 18 18 14 9 
1983 67 33 77 23 21 20 11 
1984 72 28 79 21 22 15 11 
1985 72 28 77 23 20 9 8 
1986 71 29 66 34 11 18 7 
1987 69 31 79 21 22 20 10 
1988 58 42 82 18 28 21 18 
1989 53 47 87 13 32 21 22 
1990 61 39 89 11 33 22 18 
1991 67 33 80 20 31 26 25 
1992 45 55 90 10 31 30 29 
1993 66 34 60 40 30 34 17 
1994 71 29 72 28 21 23 7 
1995 56 44 84 16 29 27 12 
1996 52 48 123 -23 57 -5 16 
1997 48 52 88 12 7 41 20 
1998 39 61 94 6 8 5 10 
1999 54 46 108 -8 37 30 17 
2000 32 68 105 -5 43 28 29 
2001 -2 102 96 4 87 17 42 
2002 56 44 118 -18 68 13 22 
2003 -93 193 279 -179 148 -13 109 
2004 -28 128 104 -4 4 61 25 
2005 41 59 109 -9 40 41 19 
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Weighted Contribution from the delivery sector. Continued. 
2006 69 31 97 3 64 20 16 
2007 64 36 112 -12 56 18 14 
2008 27 73 107 -7 29 19 24 
2009 41 59 73 27 1 26 24 
2010 50 50 116 -16 82 14 24 
2011 -463 563 120 -20 -443 98 236 
2012 27 73 112 -12 45 23 25 
 
Weighted Contribution from selected components. Part 1. 
 
Year Food and non-
alcoholic 
beverages                                            
Alcoholic 
beverages 
and tobacco
products                              
Clothing 
and 
footwear                                                              
Furniture, 
Appliances 
and 
Household 
Goods Repair              
Healthcare 
1980 21 3 8 9 3 
1981 27 5 9 9 1 
1982 23 6 6 7 3 
1983 18 4 6 8 1 
1984 23 2 11 6 2 
1985 23 3 12 7 3 
1986 25 3 9 8 2 
1987 14 6 9 7 1 
1988 15 1 5 6 1 
1989 9 3 5 3 2 
1990 11 5 4 5 5 
1991 15 8 6 4 3 
1992 -6 14 3 1 7 
1993 -1 3 8 6 3 
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Weighted Contribution from selected components. Part 1. Continued. 
 
1994 18 11 1 3 4 
1995 5 4 4 3 4 
1996 26 5 -10 4 5 
1997 20 10 -2 0 4 
1998 35 12 -3 3 8 
1999 8 4 -1 2 4 
2000 10 6 -8 1 3 
2001 -36 4 -4 2 4 
2002 13 -1 -15 1 5 
2003 68 -3 -121 -12 20 
2004 13 25 -17 -14 9 
2005 6 3 -11 2 4 
2006 11 3 -12 -2 5 
2007 13 1 -9 5 3 
2008 27 6 -21 11 4 
2009 16 6 0 6 5 
2010 -2 3 -11 -1 2 
2011 -14 176 -31 0 46 
2012 -2 9 -8 1 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
Weighted Contribution from selected components. Part 2.  
 
Year Postal and 
Telecomm. 
services                                
Culture 
and 
Leisure                                                                 
Education Hotel- and 
Restaurant 
services                                      
Other 
Goods and 
Services                                     
1980 1 10 0 2 6 
1981 1 9 0 5 3 
1982 3 11 0 5 5 
1983 2 11 1 3 6 
1984 1 10 1 3 5 
1985 -1 16 0 3 5 
1986 0 12 0 3 9 
1987 1 11 1 3 6 
1988 0 9 0 3 8 
1989 1 13 1 3 6 
1990 -5 12 0 3 4 
1991 -12 14 1 4 1 
1992 -5 16 0 5 3 
1993 -13 16 2 6 6 
1994 -5 9 0 2 12 
1995 -5 15 2 4 9 
1996 1 7 2 4 4 
1997 -4 8 3 4 11 
1998 -4 9 3 9 14 
1999 -6 9 2 3 8 
2000 -1 3 2 5 8 
2001 -3 6 2 9 12 
2002 2 3 1 5 6 
2003 -22 -21 4 18 33 
2004 -4 13 0 6 5 
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Weighted Contribution from selected components. Part 2. Continued. 
 
2005 1 5 0 4 6 
2006 2 4 0 7 -2 
2007 -7 8 0 6 5 
2008 -5 11 1 7 11 
2009 0 22 0 6 11 
2010 -3 6 0 4 6 
2011 -5 -44 7 105 204 
2012 -13 2 2 12 23 
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APPENDIX E. AVERAGE INFLATION 
 
 
January 1979- June 2013 
 
Components Inflation 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  9,53 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              5,94 
Education 5,29 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  4,68 
Other Goods and Services                                                       4,50 
Transport 4,44 
KPI 3,88 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            3,63 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 3,22 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              2,66 
Clothing and footwear                                                              0,60 
Healthcare  0,00 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -1,51 
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January 1979- August 1986 
 
Component Inflation 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  10,27 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              9,88 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            9,39 
Other Goods and Services                                                       8,96 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  8,51 
Transport 8,51 
KPI 8,39 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              8,10 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 7,46 
Education 6,93 
Clothing and footwear                                                              6,48 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                6,02 
Healthcare  0,04 
September 1986- December 1992 
 
Component Inflation 
Education 7,20 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              6,90 
Clothing and footwear                                                              5,61 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  5,46 
Transport 5,32 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  4,68 
Other Goods and Services                                                       4,57 
KPI 4,50 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 4,39 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              3,23 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            2,80 
Healthcare  0,01 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -4,00 
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January 1993- December 1998 
 
Component Inflation 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              5,18 
Education 4,30 
Other Goods and Services                                                       3,14 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  2,73 
Transport 2,63 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            2,44 
KPI 2,04 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  1,93 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 1,77 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair              0,87 
Healthcare  0,00 
Clothing and footwear                                                              -0,18 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -5,23 
January 1999- December 2013 
 
Components  Inflation 
Education 4,01 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products                              3,76 
Housing, Electricity and Fuel                                                  3,46 
Hotel and Restaurant services                                                  3,29 
Other Goods and Services                                                       2,67 
Transport 2,66 
KPI 1,98 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages                                            1,46 
Culture and Leisure                                                                 1,08 
Furniture, Appliances and Household Goods Repair 0,27 
Healthcare  -0,01 
Postal and Telecommunications services                                -2,87 
Clothing and footwear                                                              -4,36 
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